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RECONCILING DEFINITIONS OF "DISABILITY:" SIX
YEARS LATER, HAS CLEVELAND V. POLICY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS LIVED UP TO ITS INITIAL
REVIEWS AS A BOOST FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS?
Daniel B. Kohrman* and Kimberly Berg"
In the world of employment law, 1999 marked a milestone
for workers with disabilities. The United States Supreme Court
passed judgment on concepts of "disability" underlying two key
federal statutes, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the disability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act
(SSDI). A trio of decisions significantly narrowed the
circumstances in which a worker may challenge employment
discrimination on grounds of a "disability."' Yet in Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems Corp.,2 the Court preserved an
opening for other ADA claims. A unanimous Court said that a
suit based on ADA's Title I, enacted to open workplaces to
persons with "disabilities," actual or perceived, was compatible
with a worker's receipt of SSDI benefits, which Congress
authorized for people "[ulnable to engage in any substantial
gainful activity" on account of "disability."3  Thus, the Court
* Daniel Kohrman is a senior attorney with the AARP Foundation, where he
handles trials and appellate employment discrimination cases brought on
grounds of age and/or disability.
" Kimberly Berg is a third-year law student at George Washington University
and contributed to this article while working as a law clerk for the AARP
Foundation.
1. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) (all ruling that a court reviewing whether a worker has an ADA "disability," an
element required to assert a Title I claim, must take into account measures the worker takes
to "mitigate" the impact of her underlying impairments on "major life activities." Such
measures may include medication (Murphy), corrective devices such as eyeglasses (Sutton),
or "coping" mechanisms the worker employs to ameliorate an impairment's impact, such as
learning to use one eye to lessen the limitations otherwise imposed by "monocular
vision."(Albertson's)).
2. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2005).
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upheld Carolyn Cleveland's right to sue her former employer for
denying her "reasonable accommodation" at work, and at the
same time, to apply for and receive from the Social Security
Administration awarded her SSDI benefits to replace her
employment income. The Court rejected assertions by
Cleveland's employer that these forms of relief were
irreconcilable.
Since Cleveland, the legal landscape has become more
forbidding for ADA employment plaintiffs, with restrictive
United States Supreme Court decisions inspiring skepticism of
ADA claims in many state and lower federal courts. Half a
decade later, the question arises whether Cleveland still
constitutes an exception to such trends. That is, have the
possibilities seemingly afforded to ADA plaintiffs in Cleveland
been realized?
The answer to this question is of great importance to people
of all ages with disabilities, a significant share of whom have at
least a plausible basis for seeking SSDI benefits as well as ADA
protection from workplace bias. Yet the stakes are especially
great for older workers, who include a disproportionate share of
all workers with disabling impairments and who face far greater
difficulties finding new employment,4  particularly at
comparable wages,5 when they lose a job. Making it hard for
terminated workers to seek relief for disability discrimination if
they already have sought SSDI disability benefits undermines
key public policies: it discourages civil rights enforcement and
gainful employment in favor of reliance on government cash
assistance. For displaced older workers, forcing a choice
between SSDI and the ADA is particularly harsh, because it may
amount to cutting off their last, best chance to thrive in the
world of work.
INTRODUCTION
In May 1999, the Supreme Court issued its much anticipated
decision in Cleveland. The Court granted certiorari in Cleveland to
resolve a conflict among circuit courts of appeals regarding
4. L. Trupin & D.P. Rice, Health Status, Medical Use, and Number of Disabling
Conditions in the United States, 9 DISABILITY STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS (1995).
5. Kenneth A. Couch, Late Life Job Displacement, 38 GERONTOLOGIST 7 (Feb-June
1998).
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rights of SSDI beneficiaries to bring claims under the ADA. 6
Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected the Fifth
Circuit's application of a "rebuttable presumption" against ADA
claims by SSDI recipients, stating that "pursuit, and receipt of
SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from
pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong
presumption against the recipient's success under the ADA."7
The dispute in Cleveland stemmed from an apparent conflict
between basic terms of the two statutes. On one hand, the
Federal Disability Insurance Program makes available monthly
support to "every insured individual who 'is under a
disability.'"' The Social Security Act employs a definition of
"disability" focused on impairments of a kind "so severe" that a
person is "unable to do [her] previous work" and "cannot ...
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy."9
Carolyn Cleveland also sought to show, in another forum-
federal district court, that she was a "qualified individual with a
disability" under the ADA.'0 To this end, she argued that she
had limitations only so severe that she still "could 'perform the
essential functions' of her job, 'at least with reasonable
accommodations.'" 1
The crux of the Cleveland case was the employer's assertion
that eligibility for SSDI benefits and ADA remedies should be
presumed to be mutually exclusive. 12 Indeed, although both
laws address needs of individuals with disabilities, they serve
populations that, on the surface, appear quite distinct. Title I of
the ADA benefits persons with disabilities who are "qualified"
to perform gainful employment; by contrast, SSDI primarily
supports persons unable to take full advantage of, or even to
find a niche in, the world of work. Thus, SSDI eligibility often is
6. 526 U.S. at 800.
7. Id. at 797.
8. Id. at 801(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1) (1999) (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 797. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1999)).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8); 12112(a) (2005).
11. 526 U.S. at 799-800.
12. The flip-side of this contention is the equally unfounded assertion that findings of
SSDI and ADA "disability" are mutually reinforcing. See, e.g., Hayes v. Philadelphia Water
Dep't, No. Civ. A. 03-6013, 2005 WL 745857, *8 n.20 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2005) ("Hayes
cannot rely on past findings of the Social Security Administration to prove that she is
'disabled within the meaning of the ADA."').
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viewed as defining a population of persons outside the
economic mainstream, 3 while Title I of the ADA is seen as a
vehicle to integrate disabled persons into the market-based
system of opportunity inhabited by most adult Americans.
While SSDI is thought of as a safety net for persons no longer
economically productive, the ADA "seeks to eliminate
unwarranted discrimination against disabled individuals in
order both to guarantee those individuals equal opportunity and
to provide the nation with the benefit of their consequently
increased productivity."14 It is a small wonder then that persons
claiming protections of both laws have generated legal
controversy.
Based on these apparently dueling conceptions of
"disability," the Fifth Circuit deemed it no more than
"theoretically conceivable that under some limited and highly
unusual set of circumstances the two claims [to SSDI eligibility
and coverage by the ADA] would not necessarily be mutually
exclusive."" Yet, Ms. Cleveland persuaded the United States
Supreme Court that "there are ... many situations in which a
SSDI claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by
side."16
AN OVERVIEW OF CLEVELAND'S IMPLICATIONS
The Cleveland Court avoided a systematic division of persons
with disabilities into two mutually exclusive camps, consisting
of those eligible for SSDI and those permitted to assert ADA
claims.'7 Thus, the Court appears to have recognized that
13. See, e.g., Mathew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans With Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L. REV.
1003, 1006-07; 1015 (1998) (Social Security Disability Insurance appears to "erect a regime
in which people with disabilities are certified as unable to work and are segregated from the
work force." Social Security's disability definition tends to "create a boundary that separates
'the disabled' from the rest of society so that income support can be provided without
undermining the obligation to work borne by the nondisabled." Social Security Disability
Insurance is "based on an implicit view that people with disabilities should be exempt from
the obligation to work that our society imposes on its members.").
14. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 801. In other words, "[t]he ADA is premised on the
recognition that barriers to full participation in society are socially created, rather than the
inevitable consequence of medical impairments." Diller, supra note 13, at 1005.
15. Id. at 800 (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th
Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795).
16. Id. at 802-03.
17. Diller, supra note 13, at 1007-08. Thus, the Court understood that SSDI is not
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[a]lthough it may not be possible to reconcile fully the
premises of the disability programs with those of the
ADA, the tensions are not as sharp as they first appear.
The Social Security Act presents the disability benefit
programs as dealing exclusively with inability to work
due to medical impairments. However, the reality of
these programs is more complex.18
Thus, for many, the Cleveland decision signified "a major
victory for disability claimants," 9 of which there have been
precious few in the United States Supreme Court, at least in the
employment context.2 0 At first glance, Cleveland appeared to
encourage a more favorable, and more nuanced, view of ADA
employment plaintiffs: those receiving SSDI benefits no longer
could be automatically barred from filing a disability
discrimination claim against a former employer. Cleveland gave
ADA plaintiffs an opportunity to explain alleged inconsistencies
between their claims of disability supporting a SSDI application
and their assertions that they were qualified workers protected
by the ADA. Hence, it seemed "more [such ADA] plaintiffs
[would] be able to get beyond the summary judgment stage and
have the merits of their case heard in court." 21 Others predicted
simply "for people who 'cannot work; while the ADA is intended to protect disabled people
who 'can' work." Id.
18. Id. at 1009.
19. Brian Dockendorf, Recent Developments: Employment Discrimination Law, 26
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1279, 1289 (2000).
20. Since 1999, when Cleveland was decided, the Supreme Court has ruled seven times
against employee plaintiffs in cases interpreting substantive provisions of the ADA,
although most of these decisions include at least some language that has proven favorable to
ADA plaintiffs. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999);
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999). To be sure, other decisions of the Court significantly implicating the
ADA's employment provisions have been decided in favor of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Kolstad
v. American Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (vacating dismissal of punitive damages
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the ADA). But still
other major decisions have come down adverse to ADA employment plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598
(2001) (limiting recovery of attorney's fees under the ADA and various other civil rights
laws).
21. Don C.H. Kautzmann, Case Comment, Compatibility of Claim: The U.S. Supreme
Court Declines to Adopt a Presumption of Judicial Estoppel Against Plaintiffs in an
Americans With Disabilities Act Claim Who Have Already Applied for Social Security
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that Cleveland's "reasonable tone should moderate the anti-
plaintiff rhetoric that prevailed before the Supreme Court
spoke." 22 Christine Neylon O'Brien wrote, "Plaintiffs' lawyers
should breathe a sigh of relief after the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cleveland."2 3 And Dominique Jones-Sam
declared, "What is unquestionably great about the decision
handed down in Cleveland is that it put an end to the era of
confusion on the issue."24
Less sanguine observers argued, however, that Cleveland's
legacy would depend on how lower courts applied the Supreme
Court's reasoning. And, the impact of Cleveland in the lower
federal courts has been anything but a bonanza for SSDI
recipients who invoke the ADA. Rather, the federal judiciary
has continued to grant summary judgment against most
reported ADA claims presented by SSDI recipients. 25 With few
plaintiffs surviving summary judgment, a new era of confusion
seems to have descended, leaving many advocates wondering
"Did Cleveland really change anything?"
Disability Benefits, Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 76 N. D. L. REv. 411,
423 (2000).
22. Jessica Barth, Note, Disability Benefits and the ADA After Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems, 75 IND. L.J. 1317, 1337 (2000).
23. Christine Neylon O'Brien, The United States Supreme Court Resolves the Effect of
Disability Benefit Claims Upon Americans with Disabilities Act Complaints in Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems Corporation, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 115, 122 (1999).
24. Dominque Jones-Sam, Case Note, Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems: A
Step Towards Equity, 27 S.U. L. REV. 63, 79 (1999).
25. Even if federal courts were to ease or end this stingy approach, in any event, the
number of SSDI beneficiaries is unlikely to decline significantly due to the chance
Cleveland affords to some to return to the workforce by suing a former employer for
violating the ADA. Fewer than one in 500 SSDI recipients returns to work, despite program
provisions adopted over the years to encourage this. SSA Disability: Other Programs May
Provide Lessons for Improving Return-to- Work Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Soc. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104' Cong. (2000) (statement of Barbara D.
Bovbjerg, Assoc. Dir. Edu., Workforce, and Income Sec. Issues, Health, Edu., and Human
Serv. Div.). After all, SSDI
"address[es] a range of socioeconomic problems that lead to long-term
unemployment among people with disabilities, particularly among middle-aged
individuals with limited job skills. Many SSDI recipients would have trouble
obtaining work even without their impairments. Accordingly, (SSDI], do[es] not
remove large numbers of people from the work force who would, with appropriate
accommodation, be able to simply go out and find jobs. For this reason the
tensions between income support programs and the ADA appear more acute on a
rhetorical level than they are in practice."
Diller, supra note 13, at 1009.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN CLEVELAND
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In January 1994, Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke, left
work, and applied for SSDI benefits. Three months later, her
condition having improved, Cleveland returned to work at
Policy Management Systems Corporation (PMSC). Upon
learning of this, the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied
Cleveland's application. In July 1994, PMSC fired Cleveland.
Cleveland subsequently appealed her SSDI denial, representing
to the SSA that she was unable to work because of her disability.
While awaiting a decision from the SSA, Cleveland filed an
ADA claim against her former employer alleging that PMSC
failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. One week
later, the SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits retroactive to
the day of her stroke.26
LOWER COURT DECISIONS
The district court ruled that Cleveland had conceded in her
SSDI benefits application that she was totally disabled. The trial
judge granted summary judgment for PMSC without
considering the merits of Cleveland's reasonable
accommodation claim.2 7 Although the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized that "it is at least theoretically conceivable
that under some limited and highly unusual set of circumstances
the two claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive;"2
the appellate panel affirmed the grant of summary judgment. In
doing so, the Fifth Circuit noted: "To permit Cleveland to make
such an argument in the face of her prior, consistent, and until
now uncontested sworn representations to the SSA would be
tantamount to condoning her advancement of entirely
inconsistent positions, a factual impossibility and a legal
contradiction."2 9  The court of appeals concluded that the
supposed conflicts between claims under the ADA and the SSDI
program warranted application of a "rebuttable presumption"
26. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798-99.
27. Id. at 799.
28. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526
U.S. 795 (1999).
29. Id. at 518.
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barring ADA claims by persons who had applied for, or
received, SSDI benefits.
Prior to Cleveland, courts used various approaches to
address apparently inconsistent positions taken by ADA
claimants who sought or received SSDI benefits: judicial
estoppel, a rebuttable presumption against ADA claims, or
treating receipt of disability benefits as a material factor in
determining whether an individual could perform the essential
functions of a job, as required by the ADA. Regardless of the
approach used, however, few ADA plaintiffs survived motions
for summary judgment.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court
at its discretion to prevent a party from asserting inconsistent
positions.30 Among other things, judicial estoppel is intended to
"preserve the sanctity of the oath" and to "protect judicial
integrity by avoiding the risk of inconsistent results in two
proceedings."3  Prior to Cleveland, the Third and Fourth Circuits
applied judicial estoppel to prevent SSDI recipients from
pursuing claims of disability discrimination,32 and the Second
Circuit invoked judicial estoppel to bar an age-bias suit by a
SSDI beneficiary.33
Application of judicial estoppel often was accompanied by
harsh words for a plaintiff viewed as trying to "speak out of
both sides of her mouth with equal vigor and credibility before
[the] court."3 In McNemar v. Disney Store, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals wrote "[njothing permits one to undermine
the integrity of the judicial system 'by playing fast and loose
with the courts by asserting inconsistent positions."'35
Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits disavowed a per
se rule applying judicial estoppel to bar ADA claims by SSDI
recipients, both courts estopped ADA plaintiffs from denying
the truth of any statements made in a disability application.36
30. Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2nd Cir. 1999).
31. Simon v. Safelite Glass Corp., 128 F.3d 68, 71 (2nd Cir. 1997).
32. See McNemar v. Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996); Cathcart v. Flagstar,
No. 97-1977, 1998 WL 390834 (4th Cir. Jun. 29, 1998) (dismissing claims under the ADA).
33. See Simon, 128 F.3d 68 (dismissing claim under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)).
34. Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F. Supp. 963, 970 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
35. 91 F.3d at 621 (citing Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81
F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1996)).
36. Downs v. Hawkeye Health Servs, Inc., 148 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 1998); Talavera v.
36 [Vol. 7
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The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits adopted a "rebuttable
presumption" standard whereby an ADA claimant who
received disability benefits could overcome summary judgment
by offering affirmative evidence showing that he or she was
qualified for a job.17  The Eighth Circuit required an ADA
plaintiff to present "strong countervailing evidence" that he or
she was qualified, calling the claimant's burden "particularly
cumbersome." 3 8
Other federal circuit courts adopted a somewhat less
aggressive approach when confronted with apparently
inconsistent statements by ADA plaintiffs. The Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits all considered
statements made in SSDI applications to be material in
determining if an ADA plaintiff was qualified.39 Yet, these
courts all indicated judicial estoppel might be appropriate under
certain circumstances. 40
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court seemingly embraced a
more sympathetic approach to ADA claims by SSDI recipients,
unanimously concluding that "in context, [the ADA's and SSA's]
seemingly divergent statutory [regimes] are often consistent,
each with the other." 41 On this basis, the Court swept aside the
option of a rigid rule of judicial estoppel. "[P]ursuit, and receipt,
of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from
pursuing an ADA claim." 42 The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning, concluding that "the two claims [asserted by Carolyn
Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997).
37. Ivette Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1998); Cleveland,
120 F.3d 513; Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997).
38. Downs, 148 F.3d at 951 (quoting Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957 (8th Cir.
1997)).
39. Blanton v .Inco Alloys Int'l., 123 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1997); Lujan v. Pacific
Maritime Ass'n., 165 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 1999); Lowe v. Angelo's Italian Foods, No. 93-
1233-JTR, 1998 WL 255051 (10th Cir. May 19, 1998); Swanks v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
40. See, e.g., Swanks, 116 F.3d at 587 ("ADA plaintiffs who in support of claims for
disability benefits tell the Social Security Administration they cannot perform the essential
functions of a job even with accommodation could well be barred from asserting, for ADA
purposes, that accommodation would have allowed them to perform that same job.").
Accord Barth, supra note 22 at 1328.




Cleveland] do not inherently conflict to the point where courts
should apply a special negative presumption like the one
applied by the Court of Appeals here." 43
While absolving plaintiffs of having to surmount a "strong"
or "special" presumption," the Court identified another
significant, specific requirement for plaintiffs seeking to survive
summary judgment. The Court declared an ADA plaintiff
"must explain why" his or her "SSDI contention that [he or] she
was too disabled to work" was "consistent with [his or] her
ADA claim that [he or] she could 'perform the essential
functions' of [his or] her previous job, at least with 'reasonable
accommodation." 4 The Court denied plaintiffs the option of
standing mute with regard to the contents of his or her SSDI file.
A plaintiff advancing evidence of qualifications to perform
essential functions of a job allegedly denied by an employer,
without more, would be deemed to "simply ignore the apparent
contradiction that arises out of [an] earlier SSDI total disability
claim." 46 This, in turn, would "appear to negate an essential of
her ADA case, at least if she does not offer a sufficient
explanation."4 7
Moreover, the Court defined "sufficient explanation" in
such a way as to extenuate the issue of an ADA plaintiff's
truthfulness: "to defeat summary judgment, that explanation
must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding
that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in,
the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the
essential functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
43. Id. at 802.
44. Id. at 797, 798, 802, 805. The Court also elsewhere described the Court of
Appeals' approach as "a special presumption that would significantly inhibit a SSDI
recipient from simultaneously pursuing an action for disability discrimination under the
[ADA]," a "strong presumption against [a SSDI] recipient's success under the ADA," a
"special judicial presumption [that] would ordinarily prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from
successfully asserting an ADA claim," and a "special legal presumption permitting someone
who has applied for, or received, SSDI benefits to bring an ADA suit only in 'some limited
and highly unusual set of circumstances;" Id. at 800 (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt.
Sys. Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517-19 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated, 526 U.S. 795) (The 51, Circuit
held a plaintiff who applied for or received SSDI benefits had the "theoretically
conceivable" task of showing "limited and highly unusual circumstances" that might justify
overcoming "a rebuttable presumption" that he was "judicially estopped from asserting he is
a 'qualified individual with a disability."').
45. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.
46. Id. at 806.
47. Id.
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accommodation."'
The Court carefully confined its holding favorable to ADA
plaintiffs in several other respects. In what has become key
language in the lower federal courts, the Justices made clear that
Carolyn Cleveland's case did not involve conflicting statements
about factual matters:
An SSA representation of total disability differs from a
purely factual statement in that it often implies a
context-related legal conclusion, namely, 'I am disabled
for purposes of the Social Security Act.' And our
consideration of this latter kind of statement
consequently leaves the law related to the former,
purely factual, kind of conflict where we found it.49
The Court also declined to opine how its ruling should be
applied to "the interaction of either of the statutes before us with
other statutes."5 0
ANALYSIS OF THE CLEVELAND DECISION
DANGERS FOR PLAINTIFFS IN CLEVELAND
While most of the Cleveland opinion is devoted to describing
"many situations in which a SSDI claim and an ADA claim can
comfortably exist side by side,",' the Court also planted seeds
likely to bear an ample harvest for ADA defendants. Although
the Court resisted explicitly endorsing an elevated burden of
proof for ADA plaintiffs, the Court also plainly refused the relief
sought by Cleveland and her supporting amici, including the
United States. Their briefs urged the Court to affirm traditional
summary judgment principles, to rely on the federal rules of
evidence governing allegedly inconsistent admissions by a party
plaintiff and to treat evidence from a SSDI beneficiary's file as
just one piece of evidence whether an ADA plaintiff was
"qualified." 52 Thus, the Court implicitly adopted a heightened
48. Id.
49. Id at 803.
50. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
51. Id. at 803.
52. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at *36-37, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-
1008), 1999 WL 115176 ("QUESTION:... In the context of the summary judgment
motion, although she doesn't explain the prior statement, she puts in a ton of evidence that
demonstrates quite conclusively that her current condition can be accommodated. Does she
39
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summary judgment standard for ADA plaintiffs who had
received SSDI. 53
On close examination, Cleveland seems schizophrenic as to
an ADA plaintiffs need to justify prior statements supporting a
SSDI award. On the one hand, the Court took pains to
demonstrate that Cleveland herself posed merely an
"appearance of conflict" between two definitions of disability.
Further, the Court exhaustively reviewed how and why an
assertion of "total disability" in a SSDI application might reflect
"context-related legal conclusion[s]" 4 rather than binding
admissions of fact, such as "directly conflicting statements about
purely factual matters."-" Yet, the Court's sole rationale for
imposing an explanation requirement ignores this distinction.
The Court observed that various lower court decisions,
admittedly only "in somewhat comparable circumstances," and
involving, again admittedly "for the most part . .. purely factual
contradictions," have held that apparently inconsistent
statements in the same litigation - not as in Cleveland, in separate
submissions in separate proceedings under different laws -
seem to require an explanation, and preclude a trial absent the
same.56 Without supplying any convincing analysis, the Court
win or lose? MR. WALL [Counsel for Petitioner Carolyn Cleveland]: She wins."). See also
id. at * 17-18 (argument for the United States that at summary judgment, an ADA plaintiff s
past sworn statement of disability need not be ignored, but should merely be considered as
"a factor .. . in determining whether a reasonable tryer of fact could find for the plaintiff').
Accord Brief for Aids Policy Center for Children, Youth and Families, et al. as Amici Curie
Supporting Petitioner, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (No. 97-1008), 1998 WL 839955,
*26-30; Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (No. 97-1008), 1998 WL 848065,
*23-26. (An ADA plaintiffs past sworn statement of disability also could be considered as a
factor "to limit relief' if the plaintiff prevailed on her ADA claim, but was deemed to have
dissembled to the SSA.).
53. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797. Accord id. at 797, 802 (rejecting a "special negative
presumption" as "strong" as "the one applied by the Court of Appeals here") Hence, for
example, the Court did not dismiss altogether the notion of subjecting ADA plaintiffs like
Cleveland to any presumption, or of "inhibit[ing]" SSDI recipients from pursuing ADA
claims to any degree; rather, the Court only rejected a "special" presumption that would
"significantly" restrict Cleveland from prevailing at trial.. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at *37, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-1008), 1999 WL 115176 (discussing how an
explanation requirement would cause an "alteration in the summary judgment matrix"); Id
at *47 (noting Justice Breyer's view that even an ADA plaintiff who shows she is qualified
for a job still loses at the summary judgment stage "if she does not establish that she was not
lying previously").
54. Id at 802.
5 5. Id.
56. Id. at 806.
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simply asserted, "we believe a similar insistence upon
explanation is warranted here, where the conflict involves a
legal conclusion."5 7 Why? The Court simply did not say.
It is tempting to conclude that Justice Breyer achieved
unanimity in Cleveland by crafting an opinion with something
for all his colleagues: a sharp critique of judicial estoppel, a
roadmap informing at least some dual ADA/SSDI claimants how
they might prevail, and a mildly-worded embrace of a
presumption against pursuing both ADA and SSDI claims
without a "sufficient explanation." 8  But the reasoning
underlying this compromise remains elusive, except for the
justifications advanced for approaches rejected by the Court.
That is, other than a desire to "preserve the sanctity of the oath"
and to "protect judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of
inconsistent results in two proceedings," the primary rationales
for judicial estoppel, there appears little basis for the explanation
requirement established in Cleveland. The Court also expressed
interest in keeping faith with the traditional prohibition against
allowing a plaintiff to "create a genuine issue of fact .. . to
survive summary judgment simply by flatly contradicting his or
her own previous sworn statement," but failed to explain why
this concern was relevant, if not to "preserve judicial integrity,"
given the Court's recognition that in many cases, a claim of
"disability" supporting a SSDI award may be consistent with a
subsequent ADA suit, and thus, any apparent inconsistency is
quite different from factual contradictions federal courts have
condemned in other civil cases.59
The Cleveland decision also is murky as to why a trial court
reviewing a SSDI recipient's ADA claim must take responsibility
for policing concerns of judicial integrity. After all, the best test
of whether an ADA plaintiff is dissembling to the court is to
assess her evidence that she was "qualified" to work at the time
she allegedly suffered disability bias. Any prior, supposedly
contrary, representations to SSA would not have been made to
the court. If the ADA plaintiff is thought to have dissembled to
57. Id. at 807.
58. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *35, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (No. 97-
1008), 1999 WL 115176, (member of Court summarizing "Justice Breyer's assumption...
that, even though in the summary judgment proceedings the plaintiff establishes that she
currently could do the work with an accomodation ... nonetheless if she does not
establish that she was not lying previously she loses").
59. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806-807.
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the SSA, but not to the court, it is the SSA, not the court, that has
cause to demand an explanation. If SSA is not satisfied, it
should take action regarding that claimant.
Finally, Cleveland did not address another issue that was of
intense concern to the litigants in that case and directly relevant
to the debate about how tough federal district courts should be
in assessing ADA claims by SSDI recipients: whether an
explanation requirement undermines the statutory goals of the
ADA or the SSDI program. In particular, the Cleveland Court
failed to discuss the goal of maximizing gainful employment of
persons with disabilities and minimizing their dependence on
the government for income support, which the United States
and other parties characterized as core objectives of both the
ADA and the SSDI programs.60
At oral argument, Justice Ginsburg described as "a very
curious thing about this case" that the employer's support for
sanctions against SSDI recipients who seek ADA relief, such that
result in persons who are possibly able to work may remain on
SSDI because they cannot press their ADA claims. Surely, she
said, this "works against the Social Security Administration,
because they don't want to carry this person on the disability
roll if they can work." 61 By contrast, Justice Scalia argued, far
less convincing, that such sanctions might deter dishonesty on
the part of SSDI applicants. He suggested that persons who can
60. Further, the Court declined to follow the approach favored by agencies responsible
for enforcing the ADA and the Social Security Act. Both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the SSA maintain that statements regarding an
individual's status in one context are not dispositive in another. According to EEOC "the
determination of what, if any, weight to give to representations made in support of
applications for disability benefits depends on the context and timing of the
representations." Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, No. 915.002, EEOC
Enforcement Guidance on the Effect of Representations Made in Applications for Benefits
on the Determination of Whether a Person Is a "Qualified Individual with a Disability"
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (1997), 1999 WL 33159167. Use of
generalized terminology, or checking a box on a SSDI application, is unlikely to be a precise
and accurate determination whether an applicant is a "qualified individual" for ADA
purposes. Id. at 19-20. The SSA has long followed a similar, case-by-case approach. For
example, when reviewing a SSDI application, the SSA "does not consider statements made
in connection with the applicant's unemployment compensation claim (i.e. that he or she
was able to work) when evaluating the claimant's credibility. A decision ... must reflect
all the evidence." U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Social Security
Administration, Office of Hearing and Appeals, October 26, 1993, "Memorandum To: All
OHA Field Personnel ... SUBJECT: Reminders," at 3.
61. Transcript of Oral Arguments at *22, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795 (No. 97-1008), 1999
WL 115176.
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work, who he asserted "don't belong on the [SSDI] rolls,"
contrary to the Court's analysis in its subsequent unanimous
published opinion, and who presumably may wish to advance
ADA claims some day, will be deterred from applying for SSDI
and securing it by the possible loss of future ADA claims.6 2 The
likelihood of such deterrence seems highly remote given the
difficulty of winning an ADA case, among other factors. But
more importantly, the assumption underlying the deterrence
discussion is that there is something inherently suspicious about
persons, even a very small number of them, receiving SSDI
benefits and claiming they can work. Yet that is exactly what the
Court labored to refute in its unanimous decision.63
Regardless how uncertain Cleveland's logical foundations
now appear, the question remains: what impact has Cleveland
had on motions for summary judgment in ADA and other
similar cases brought by SSDI recipients?
SAFE HARBORS FOR ADA PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE RECEIVED
SSDI BENEFITS
Before assessing Cleveland's impact, it is important briefly to
review the categories of ADA cases the Supreme Court
identified as legitimately brought by SSDI recipients.
First, the Supreme Court noted that courts reviewing ADA
claims must consider whether a worker is a "qualified person
with a disability," taking into account the employer's duty to
provide "reasonable accommodation."64 However, "[b]y way of
contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual is
disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of
'reasonable accommodation' into account, nor need an applicant
refer to the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she
62. Id. at *24.
63. Brief for Lawson, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lawson v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (71h Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1179) at *18-19. (Indeed, the EEOC has taken the
position that receiving SSDI has been "repeatedly recognized [as] probative evidence that an
individual has a disability under the ADA.").
64. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803 (The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
against any "qualified individual with a disability" with regard to any "terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment."); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1990); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1990)
(The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.").
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applies for SSDI."65 The Court recognized that "the matter of
'reasonable accommodation' may turn on highly disputed
workplace-specific matters; and a SSA misjudgment about that
detailed, and often fact-specific matter would deprive a
seriously disabled person of ... critical financial support." 6 As
a result, "[an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff can perform
her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove
consistent with a SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform
her own job (or other jobs) without it."67
Second, the SSA's need to efficiently administer a large
benefits program has caused a majority of disability
determinations to be made without assessing an applicant's
actual ability to work, based on "a set of presumptions about
disabilities, job availability, and their interaction."6 8 The SSA
employs a sequential, five-step process for determining if a SSDI
applicant has a medical impairment so severe that he or she
cannot engage in any "substantial gainful work that exists in the
national economy." 69 If an applicant is out of work and can
claim a "severe" impairment, he or she can earn SSDI benefits at
"Step Three" by demonstrating that his or her condition
"meet[s] or equal[s]" an "impairment on a specific (and fairly
lengthy) SSA list."70 The United States informed the Court at
oral argument that "approximately 60 percent of all [SSDIJ
awards" are made at Step Three7' "without any inquiry into
their ability to do their past job or their ability to do other
employment in the national economy." 72 Inquires are only made
at Steps 4 and 5 if an applicant is found ineligible at Step 3.71
The Court concluded that this analytical method "inevitably
simplif[ies], eliminating consideration of many differences
potentially relevant to an individual's ability to perform a
65. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803 (citation omitted).
66. Id. See Brief of United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Cleveland, 526 U.S. 975 (1999) (No. 97-1008), 1998 WL 839956, 10-11; n.2 & 13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 804.
69. 20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 404.1560 (2004).
70. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (citing 20 CFR §§ 404.1520 (b), (c) (2005)). (Step One
requires a negative response to the query "Are you presently working?"; Step Two requires
a negative response to the query "Do you have a "severe" impairment, i.e., one that
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particular job,"7 4 which is the focus of the ADA disability
determination process.
In addition, the Court identified three other major reasons
why an ADA claimant should not have his or her suit dismissed
simply by virtue of having sought SSDI benefits:
* "[T]he SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals
who not only can work, but are working. For example,
to facilitate a disabled person's reentry into the
workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-month trial-work
period during which SSDI recipients may receive full
benefits."75
* "The nature of an individual's disability may change over
time, so that a statement made about that disability at the
time of an individual's application for SSDI benefits may
not reflect an individual's capacities at the time of the
relevant employment decision."7 6
* An individual who has merely applied for, but not
received SSDI benefits should not be estopped from
asserting an ADA claim because "any inconsistency in
the theory of the claims is of the sort normally tolerated
by our legal system."77
POST-CLEVELAND DECISIONS
Initially, the Court's pragmatic approach in Cleveland suggested
a victory for ADA plaintiffs. The decision seemed to reconcile
goals of the ADA and the SSDI program, rather than forcing
74. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804.
75. Id. at 805. Congress has since enacted, and SSA has since implemented still other
SSDI program provisions "to facilitate . . . reentry into the workforce" by persons with
disabilities. See, e.g., The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999). "The Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program"
intended "to expand the universe of service providers available to individuals who are
entitled to Social Security benefits ... based on disability or blindness in obtaining the
services necessary to find, enter and retain employment." 20 CFR § 411.105 (2005).
76. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805.
77. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2) allowing the assertion of alternative theories of
liability). Thus, plaintiffs generally may advance alternative theories, regardless of
inconsistency. However, the Court also said ADA plaintiffs should be held to specific facts
asserted in a SSDI application. After briefly discussing the limited effect of merely
applying for SSDI, the Court added, "And, as we said, we leave the law with respect to
purely factual contradictions where we found it." Id. at 805. As a result, even unsuccessful
SSDI applicants may be held to detailed factual statements made in writing to SSA when
pursuing an ADA claim.
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individuals to choose between them. Immediately following the
Court's decision, some commentators even criticized Cleveland
on grounds that plaintiffs could too easily take advantage of the
minimal requirements necessary to reconcile their seemingly
contrary positions as to whether they were "disabled."78
Since Cleveland, however, only a few reported decisions
have permitted SSDI recipients to survive summary judgment
on ADA claims. Cleveland now is most often cited to justify
application of judicial estoppel to prevent ADA plaintiffs from
denying "factual matters" pertaining to their SSDI applications.
Indeed, it appears that inconsistencies between statements in a
SSDI application and an ADA complaint often are readily, if at
times improperly, characterized and construed as questions of
fact, thereby enabling ADA defendants to distinguish Cleveland
and earn summary judgment. Indeed, Cleveland's benefits for
ADA plaintiffs are strikingly less evident in reported decisions
than was predicted when Cleveland issued. Rather, it may be
that Cleveland's benefits for plaintiffs most significantly consist of
the absence of a judicial estoppel defense in cases in which it
might once have been asserted, such as where an ADA plaintiff
applied for, but was ultimately denied SSDI benefits.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS
Following Cleveland, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeal all have applied various forms of estoppel to
prevent ADA plaintiffs from asserting factually inconsistent
positions.79 In Motley v. New Jersey State Police, the Third Circuit
focused on Cleveland's distinction between conflicting legal
conclusions and purely factual disputes. Whereas Cleveland's
78. Jane M. Keenan, A Social Security Claimant's Statement that She is Disabled and
Unable to Work Does Not Necessarily Preclude a Subsequent ADA Wrongful Termination
Claim: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 38 DuQ. L. REv. 685
(2000).
79. Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1 (2nd Cir. 1999); Motley v.
N.J. State Police, 196 F.3d 160 (3rd Cir. 1999); Devine v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Elkhart
County, 49 F. App'x 57 (7th Cir. 2002); Opsteen v. Keller Structures, Inc., 408 F.3d 390,
392 (71h Cir. 2005) (noting plaintiff "acknowledge[d] that his current position [was] factually
inconsistent with [that] maintained in his application for benefits," the court concluded
plaintiff "wants to have things two ways, depicting himself as mentally incompetent in order
to obtain disability benefits but as mentally capable in order to secure employment.... he
seeks to maintain both gloomy and optimistic medical evaluations ... and to benefit from
different sources based on these incompatible positions. Cleveland holds that courts need
not tolerate this maneuver.").
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SSDI application contained blanket statements of disability,
Motley offered detailed descriptions of his specific injuries and
his inability to work."0 As a result, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the inconsistencies in Motley's record involved a
factual dispute regarding his physical capacities. Hence,
Cleveland did not apply and Motley was precluded from
pursuing an ADA claim.81
The court in Motley also noted that Cleveland held that
"where factual inconsistencies between claims exist, as opposed
to context-specific legal conclusions, .. . the law remains, 'where
[the Cleveland Court] found it.'"82 The Third Circuit concluded
that Motley's efforts to reconcile his inconsistent statements
were insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court
faulted Motley's failure to address his own detailed statements
of disability, declaring "It is difficult to get around the
conclusion that, in at least one of the fora, Motley was not
completely honest."83
The dissent in Motley urged a remand, as in Cleveland itself,
for the plaintiff to have an opportunity to explain seemingly
inconsistent statements. Indeed, the reasoning of Judge
Rendell's dissent supports a remand whenever an ADA plaintiff
is denied a chance to explain because of alleged inconsistencies
being addressed for the first time on appeal. The district court in
Motley failed to consider an explanation from the plaintiff
because its decision predated Cleveland.8
80. Motley, 196 F.3d at 166.
81. Id. at 167. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the disability retirement
determination process at issue, unlike a SSDI eligibility review, "took the fundamental job
requirements for state police officers, along with reasonable accommodations, such as light
duty, into account ..... Id. at 166.
82. Id. at 164. (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 1601-02). Cf Murphey v. City of
Minneapolis, 358 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing Motley, reasoning that a plaintiff
could not be precluded from pursuing an ADA claim by his physician's detailed statement
of bases for his claiming total and permanent disability).
83. Id. at 166. The Third Circuit also noted that if a plaintiff was only required to point
out the different definitions of disability under each statute, summary judgment could never
be granted. Id. at 165. See also Musarra v. Vineyards Dev. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1122 (M.D. Fl. 2004) (admonishing SSDI recipient who brought ADA claim for
"[c]learly ... attempting to perpetrate a sham.").
84. Motley, 196 F.3d at 168 (Rendell, J., dissenting) ("It is not for the court upon
defendant's raising of this inconsistency, to decide on its own whether the inconsistency can
be reconciled. How can we, now, after Cleveland, deny this opportunity which is clearly
mandated?"). Cleveland was decided after the district court granted summary judgment
against Motley, but before the Court of Appeals ruled. As a result, Judge Rendell
maintained, Motley should have an opportunity to explain inconsistencies based on
47
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By contrast, courts grant summary judgment for
defendants, as in Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., upon concluding a
plaintiff "has offered no evidence to explain [a] discrepancy"
between factual assertions supporting ADA and SSDI claims."
Plaintiffs are presumed to know of their duty to explain,
regardless of whether the parties or the court ever squarely
addressed the issue.86  Defendants likewise have a
corresponding duty to present "evidence of any particular
inconsistent assertions" that the plaintiff allegedly made.87
In Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central School District8 the
Second Circuit also upheld the use of judicial estoppel to
prevent an ADA plaintiff from asserting inconsistent factual
positions. Mitchell argued that the district court's application of
judicial estoppel to prevent him from pursuing his ADA claim
violated principles set forth in Cleveland. However, the Court of
Appeals found that "if the requirements for judicial estoppel are
otherwise met, Mitchell may be prevented from claiming, as a
factual matter, that he could stand and walk at work on the basis
standards discussed in Cleveland. Id at 168-71.
85. 262 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1118 (2002) (emphasis
added). See also Degroat v. Power Logistics, 118 F. App'x 575, 575 (3rd Cir. Dec. 10, 2004)
(dismissing ADA claim where plaintiff who received SSDI benefits did not reconcile
inconsistent statements, but simply "re-explain[ed] his injuries and condition"); Bass v.
County of Butte, No. CIV-S-02-2443 DFL/CG, 2004 WL 1925468, at *4 (E.D. Ca. Aug. 6
2004) (finding that ADA plaintiff never explained "how she can be unable to perform any
'substantial gainful work' but yet be able to perform her dispatch job with
accommodation").
86. In Sullivan, the court did not say whether the issue was ever joined in the district
court. In Lane v. BFI Waste Systems, 257 F.3d 766 (8h Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals
affirmed a summary judgment for BFI, declaring that the plaintiff "proffered no evidence
below to harmonize his inconsistent statements" to SSA and the trial court. "Even though
Mr. Lane did not have the guidance of Cleveland below," the court reasoned, "he was
required by then-existing case law to provide evidence to reconcile his seemingly
contradictory statements." Id. at 770 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals also rejected
explanations provided by plaintiff in his appellate reply brief. Id. at 771-72.
87. Tullos v. City of Nassau Bay, 137 F. App'x 638, 647 (5t Cir. 2005) (expressing a
need, under Cleveland, to evaluate "specific assertions [plaintiff] made to obtain [SSDI]
benefits, along with his explanation for any inconsistencies;" without the former, the court
said, it could not consider defendant's challenge to plaintiffs assertion that he was "a
qualified individual under the ADA"). Moreover, the Tenth Circuit recently sustained a trial
court's refusal to permit an employer to introduce documentary evidence for a jury to
resolve the issue of alleged factual inconsistencies between ADA and SSDI claims. The
appeals court sustained the exclusion of this evidence, thereby precluding jury consideration
of an estoppel argument, and observed that "Cleveland does not necessarily mandate their
admission." Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10" Cir. 2005).
88. 190 F.3d I (2nd Cir. 1999).
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of prior factual assertions to the contrary."89 Because the District
Court's application of judicial estoppel was based on Mitchell's
factual assertions, its decision was consistent with Cleveland.
In Devine v. Board of Commissioners of Elkhart County,90 the
plaintiff argued that he could work at the time of his termination,
despite prior contrary statements to the SSA and at his own
deposition. The court seems to have been persuaded that these
factual inconsistencies warranted summary judgment and
application of judicial estoppel, which the court explained,
"'bars a litigant who has obtained a judgment on the basis of
proving one set of facts from obtaining a judgment by turning
around and proving that the facts were actually the opposite of
what he had proved in the prior case."'91 However, the Seventh
Circuit misstated clear principles articulated in Cleveland,
mistakenly suggesting that the Supreme Court's 1999 decision
precluded the plaintiff's reliance on "seemingly inconsistent
positions"- that is "sworn statement[s]" that "he could do the
work," and his "knowing decision" to pursue a "theory" of SSDI
eligibility premised on an assertion of "disability" different from
that on which he based his ADA case.92 Yet Cleveland plainly
held that while it is proper for a court to estop an ADA claim
based on "conflicting statements about purely factual matters,"
estoppel may not premised on "a context-related legal
conclusion [such as] 'I am disabled for purposes of the Social
Security Act.' 93
Devine poses an instance in which mechanical application of
the "factual inconsistencies" holding in Cleveland appears unjust.
The Sixth Circuit seemed to recognize that Mr. Devine was able
to continue working, albeit with great difficulty, despite severe
impairments related to AIDS.94 Further, the court's summary of
89. Id. at 16.
90. 49 F. App'x 57 (6th Cir. 2002).
91. Id. at 61 (citing Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 529 (7"' Cir. 2002)).
92. Id. at 60-62.
93. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 802.
94. See Devine, 49 F. App'x at 62 ("Indeed, the record suggests that Devine was
truthful on his disability application and that he is a gravely ill man, one who continued
working long past the point that others might have quit.") (emphasis added). Plaintiff told
SSA, inter alia: "I was diagnosed ... 7-14-98. From that date to the point I stopped
working I would miss quite a lot of work due to infections & [other] symptoms. I finally
stopped working ... 10-99. I tried to keep working as long as possible to keep my
insurance.... I am not working at all, because of my condition... . [T]he side effects &
symptoms of my infections continue to prevent me from working." These statements may
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the record indicates that Devine never conveyed to the SSA a
detailed, unequivocal statement of his inability to work at the
time of his discharge. 5 Indeed, the Court of Appeals specifically
noted that Devine "point[ed] out that he was working as a jail
officer when he was fired and, except for a number of absences,
was performing the job well." 6 The Seventh Circuit erred in
failing to explain why the record in Devine fell short of posing a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of the plaintiff's
qualifications. The court invoked what it described as "the point
of the judicial estoppel doctrine," and seemingly relied on moral
condemnation, rather than legal reasoning consistent with the
Cleveland decision. The court declared: "Devine, like the plaintiff
in Lee, 'made a knowing decision upon his discharge to apply for
disability benefits on the theory that he could not do the
work."'97
In Lee v. City of Salem, unlike in Devine, the Seventh Circuit
clearly and extensively discussed the difference between legal
and factual inconsistencies, and concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to follow Cleveland's guidance regarding how to "resolve"
an inconsistency between "context-related legal conclusions"
made in support of ADA and SSDI claims. 98 The Lee court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, on grounds that the
plaintiff
d[id] not account for his previous statements by
explaining, for example, that the SSA does not consider
the possibility of reasonable accommodations, so that
when he claimed he was unable to return to his job for
the city, he was simply saying that he could no longer
do that job unless the city accommodated him . . . . .
Instead, he accepts the natural import of [his]
show incapacity at the time they were written, but they seem ambiguous as to Devine's
status when he was discharged; yet the Court of Appeals concluded this testimony
"conflicted with [his] claim that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA,
because [he] could not be both unable to work and capable of performing the essential duties
of a jail officer." Id. at 61.
95. Id. at 61.
96. Id.
97. Id at 61-62 (citing Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 677 (7"' Cir. 2001)).
98. 259 F.3d at 672-76. Accord Feldman v. Am. Mem'l Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783,
791 (7" Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for employer; plaintiff must show
"apparent inconsistency [between her statements supporting ADA and SSDI) claims can be
resolved with reference to variance between the definitions of 'disability' contemplated by
the ADA and SSDI.").
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statements (that he could no longer work as a sexton,
period), contends that he so believed at the time he
applied for benefits, and indicates that he has since had
a change of heart.99
This approach by an ADA claimant has been held to violate the
ruling in Cleveland that a plaintiff "cannot create a genuine issue
of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by
contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement."100
PLAINTIFFS SUCCESSFUL IN SURVIVING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A small number of plaintiffs have successfully relied on the
rationales advanced in Cleveland as justifying ADA claims by
SSDI recipients. However, it is noteworthy that a number of
courts have characterized such rulings as upholding narrow
"exceptions" to a general trend of ADA claim preclusion.
SSA Did Not Consider Ability to Work with Reasonable
Accommodation
A SSDI application may comfortably co-exist with an ADA
claim when an individual makes only conclusory statements on
a SSDI application. Indeed, in Cleveland, the Supreme Court
recognized that general statements of disability are consistent
with an individual's claim that he could have continued to work
with a reasonable accommodation, because the SSA "does not
take the possibility of 'reasonable accommodation' into
99. Lee, 259 F.3d at 676.
100. Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806) (affirming summary judgment for defendant
employer). See also Herrera v. CTS Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 921, 929 (S.D. Tx. 2002)
(rejecting plaintiff s explanation that now he could perform the essential functions of the job
in question); Lincoln v. Momentum Sys. Ltd., 86 F. Supp. 2d 421, 428-29 (D. N.J. 2000)
(dismissing plaintiffs ADA claims because plaintiff failed to explain inconsistent
statements of disability made in benefit applications); Donahue v. Occidental Chem. Corp.,
No. Civ. A. 98-1803, 1999 WL 1277537, at *6-7 (E.D.La. Dec. 27, 1999) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to provide a sufficient explanation of why he contradicted his prior sworn
statement); Allen v. Pacific Bell, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Ca. 2002); Swanson v.
Medical Action Indus., Inc., 343 F. Supp. 2d 496, (W.D.N.C. 2004) (rejecting ADA
plaintiffs explanation that he could "possibly" perform another job where his prior




account."10 The same is true if an ADA claimant describes his
or her disabilities but never actually tells the SSA he or she is
unable to work.0 2
The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have rejected an
employer's prayer for summary judgment, or judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, where an ADA plaintiff made
assertions pertaining to disability status in a SSA application
that were not specific and where the plaintiff also claimed an
ability to work with reasonable accommodation.
In Giles v. General Electric Co., 0 the court acknowledged that
"[the plaintiff's] SSDI application asserted that he has 'recurrent
disk herniation, resulting with [sic] leg pain & numbness,'
'inability to walk more than 1 1/2 blocks,' and a 'perm[anent]
[weight] restriction.' The application also stated that Giles has
'[c]hronic pain' and that he 'can't walk or stand long."' 104
Although some courts might have found these statements
sufficiently detailed to justify granting judgment for the
defendant, the Fifth Circuit accepted the plaintiff's explanation
that his statements to the SSA did not take into consideration the
possibility of a reasonable accommodation. In essence, the
plaintiff made the same argument as Carolyn Cleveland
concerning the different legal definitions of disability. The court
concluded: "Giles's SSDI application is similar to those in
Cleveland. . ., in that it contains no specific assertions resisting
his explanation that he could perform his job with reasonable
accommodation ... ."1 o5
Likewise, in EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit held that the plaintiff's statement to the SSA that "'I [am]
unable to work because of my disabling condition' did not take
into account whether [the plaintiff] could have worked with a
reasonable accommodation." 6 Thus, the plaintiff was not
101. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803.
102. See, e.g., Hannah v. County of Cook, No. 03-CV-6648, 2005 WL 1026716, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2005) (refusing to bar plaintiffs ADA claim based on judicial estoppel
because her "application for total temporary worker's compensation benefits does not
include a statement that she was unable to work").
103. 245 F.3d 474, 484 (5th Cir. 2001).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 485. As an initial matter, the court also found that the plaintiff was not
precluded from bringing an ADA claim because his application for SSDI benefits was
ultimately denied by the SSA. Id. at 483.
106. 216 F.3d 373, 379 (4' Cir. 2000). The court also noted that, when applying for
SSDI benefits, the plaintiff told the SSA intake worker that she could work with reasonable
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precluded from pursuing her ADA discrimination claim. 10 7
Similarly, receipt of state-funded disability retirement benefits
did not preclude an ADA claim by a teacher who, at the time of
her retirement, had sought reasonable accommodation, "to
which the school [system] did not respond."10 Also, in the
Second Circuit, receipt of private long-term disability benefits
and SSDI benefits did not bar disability bias claims by a movie-
industry manager who was refused accommodation and
terminated.109
In Olds v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
reversed a summary judgment for the defendant employer, and
rejected UPS' claim that "Olds is precluded from demonstrating
that he [was] qualified to work because an administrative law
judge found him entitled to [SSDI] benefits."no The court
deemed Olds' identification of two specific accommodations
UPS could have provided to permit him to continue working as
"satisfactory" explanations of any alleged inconsistencies.'
accommodation. This statement, while powerful evidence for plaintiff, was not critical:
"nor need [a SSDI] applicant [who later seeks to rely on the ADA] refer to the possibility of
reasonable accommodation when she applies for SSDI."
107. Id. Accord Fox v. General Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 178 (4th Cir. 2001).
108. Dotson v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., 21 F. App'x 368, 370 (61h Cir. 2001).
109. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 332-36 (2nd Cir. 2000). Several
other courts have similarly found that plaintiffs were not estopped from bringing claims
where they could have performed the essential functions of the job with a reasonable
accommodation. See, e.g., Nodelman v. Gruner & Jahr USA Publ'g, No. 98 CIV. 1231,
2000 WL 502858, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 2000). Accord Felix v. N.Y. City Transit
Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to apply judicial estoppel to
prevent SSDI recipient from bringing ADA claim where the situation did not involve
"directly conflicting statements about purely factual matters;" granting summary judgment
for defendant on other grounds); Burke v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., Civ. No. 4-99-CV-
30634, 2001 WL 739595, at *5-7 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 22, 2001) (noting that plaintiff was not
judicially estopped from bringing an ADA claim because she could have performed the
work with a reasonable accommodation; however, summary judgment for the defendant was
appropriate where plaintiff failed to request an accommodation); Thompson v. E.I. Dupont
de Nemours & Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 764, 776 n.9 (E.D. Mich. 2001), af'd, 70 F. App'x 332
(6th Cir. 2003) (refusing to apply judicial estoppel where defendant had not identified any
"purely factual contentions made by Plaintiff in connection with his application for SSDI
benefits that contradict factual assertions he has made in this case."); Johnson v. Hoechst
Celanese Corp., 127 S.W.3d 875, 880-82 (Tex. App. 2004) (as in Cleveland, "plaintiffs'
seemingly ruinous statements regarding their total disability [supporting award of private
long-term disability benefits] c[ould] be construed as legal conclusions, rather than factual
conclusions" and did not include "additional specific factual statements that belie[d the]
claim that [they] could perform [their] job[s] with accommodation," and thus, did not
preclude state disability bias claim under Texas Commission on Human Rights Act).
110. 127 F. App'x 779, 783 (6th Cir. 2005).
111. Id. at784.
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On the other hand, when a SSDI application, or evidence
assembled in the SSDI review process, includes facts or
statements undermining an ADA plaintiff's assertion that she
can do a job with reasonable accommodation, a facially
"sufficient" explanation of pleading inconsistencies may be
undermined, and judicial estoppel properly applied.112 Where a
court bases such a conclusion on plaintiff's failure to present
colorable evidence that she could do her former job at the time
of her discharge, notwithstanding later assertions of total
disability to the SSA, summary judgment for the employer
would appear warranted under Cleveland."' However, in
weighing a plaintiff's evidence that he or she is qualified in light
of statements to the SSA regarding her disability, a trial court
should not supplant the jury's fact-finding role. Thus, it would
appear presumptively improper for a court to overturn a pro-
112. See Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477, 480 (5 h Cir. 2000) (in SSDI
review process plaintiff "made specific factual statements ... inconsistent with her claim
that she could fly a helicopter" this was an essential job function that she could not perform
even with reasonable accommodation); Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 F. App'x 49, 56 (4th Cir.
2002) (affirming judgment that plaintiff "was not a 'qualified individual' inasmuch as he
could not perform the essential functions of his job [even] with reasonable
accommodation"); Lloyd v. Hardin County, 207 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming
summary judgment for employer; rejecting plaintiffs explanation of inconsistencies
between ADA and SSDI claims as "insufficient," as assertion plaintiff could do job with
reasonable accommodation was faulty, in that the proposed accommodation would require
reallocation of essential job functions); Moore v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 187 F.3d 845,
848 (8' Cir. 1999) (reinstating summary judgment for employer; rejecting plaintiffs new,
post-Cleveland explanation that her ADA claim was premised on the assertion that she
could perform her former job with reasonable accommodation; noting lack of evidence that
Moore timely advised Payless "what accommodation specific to her F osition and workplace
was needed"); DiSanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 220 F.3d 61, 64 (2' Cir. 2000) (affirming
judgment for employer where discharged worker receiving SSDI failed to reconcile claim
that he could work with accommodation and unqualified statement to SSA that he had been
"unable to work" since the months prior to his discharge); Lukacinsky v. Panasonic Serv.
Co., Civ. No. 03-40141-FDS, 2004 WL 2915347, *22 n.34 (D. Mass. Nov. 29, 2004).
Accord Opsteen v. Keller Structures Inc., 408 F.3d 390, 392 (7h Cir. 2005) (observing that
"[in order to obtain long-term disability benefits" under his employer's plan governed by
ERISA, plaintiff "had to demonstrate that he could not do his work even with a reasonable
accommodation" and that plaintiff secured such benefits because his "wife made that
representation on his behalf, with considerable medical support.. . . This is exactly the sort
of factual contradiction that Cleveland forbids").
113. See, eg, Dorsey v. City of Chicago, No. 01-C-2552, 2005 WL 1340811, at *11
(N.D. Ill. June 6, 2005) ("[p]laintiff has failed to produce affirmative evidence that
demonstrates [she] could perform the essential functions of [her former job] with or without
reasonable accommodations," and so gave insufficient "explanation" of conflicting
representations of serious disability to the SSA and a private disability insurer); see also
Kozlowski v. Penn National Insurance, No. Civ. A. 1:04-CV-0716, 2005 WL 1163148, at
*2-3 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2005).
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plaintiff verdict in a Cleveland case on grounds that record facts
concerning an ADA "disability" cannot be reconciled with facts
supporting a SSDI application to the court's satisfaction.114 This
is especially so when plaintiff's case includes colorable proof
both that he or she was "qualified" under the ADA when he or
she lost her job, and that his or her SSDI benefits are well-
supported by evidence of current disability.115 Rather, the sound
course would seem to be to let "the jury hear[] all the evidence,
including [the plaintiff's] explanation for the [allegedly]
contradictory claims," and to assure the jury is "instructed on
the Cleveland standard."'16 A sound general rule would be for
trial courts to entertain summary judgment against plaintiffs for
failure to sufficiently explain "factual inconsistencies" between
ADA claims and a SSDI application only "when the evidence
unequivocally indicates that the plaintiff could not have
performed his or her job at the time of termination even with
[an] accommodation." 17
Temporal Differences Explain Asserted Inconsistencies
Between A Plaintiff's Statements Regarding Ability to Work
In Cleveland, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "an
individual's disability may change over time, so that a statement
about that disability at the time of an individual's application for
SSDI benefits may not reflect an individual's capacities at the
time of the relevant employment decision." 18 It follows that a
plaintiff who asserts on a SSDI application that he or she became
114. See, e.g., DiSanto, 220 F.3d at 64 (affirming reversal of jury verdict for employee
on grounds that the discharged worker receiving SSDI failed to reconcile substantial
evidence that he could work with accommodation when discharged, and had developed a
disabling depression since then, in light of a single statement to the SSA that he had been
"unable to work" ten months prior to his discharge).
115. The DiSanto court appears to have thrown out a plausible verdict for plaintiff
simply to vindicate the proposition that plaintiff should not have had both an ADA claim
and SSDI benefits for any period of time in which he claimed to be a qualified employee
under the ADA. An alternative remedy would have been to require plaintiff to reimburse
SSA for unwarranted benefits received, or perhaps simply to supervise plaintiff affording
SSA notice of an inconsistency. SSA could then seek reimbursement.
116. Voeltz v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 406 F.3d 1047, 1050-51 (8"' Cir. 2005) (affirming a
verdict for the plaintiff given "sufficient record evidence for the jury to conclude that
Voeltz's ADA claim was not inconsistent with his application for disability benefits").
117. Lukacinsky, 2004 WL 2915347, at *22 n.34 (citing Kelly v. Lockheed Martin
Servs. Group, 198 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D. P. R. 2002)).
118. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805.
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unable to work at some point after the adverse employment
action was taken, may not be precluded from bringing an ADA
claim. 119
Thus, a plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing an ADA
claim due to receiving SSDI benefits given "evidence of the
marked improvement in [his] condition due to the success of the
experimental cancer treatment" in which he enrolled, and of
which he informed his employer, prior to his termination and
his subsequent SSDI award.12 0
In Fox v. General Motors Corp.,'21 the Fourth Circuit allowed
an ADA plaintiff, who filed a disability application shortly after
being terminated, to pursue his claim of disability
discrimination, which concerned harassment at work prior to his
discharge. On his application, Fox stated that his disability
began only after he was fired. Fox bolstered this claim by
asserting he could have worked with reasonable
accommodation.122
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, was less
understanding of an ADA plaintiff who filed for SSDI benefits
only one day after being terminated. 123 The plaintiff attempted
to explain alleged inconsistencies by arguing that his
termination had a devastating emotional effect upon him, which
seriously impaired his physical health. The appeals court
119. See, e.g., Felix v. New York City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652 (S.D.
N.Y. 2001) (as in Cleveland, the plaintiff "stated that her condition had worsened" between
the time of her discharge, which was the basis for her ADA claim, and the time of her SSDI
application; thus, "her statements were accurate 'in the time period in which they were
made,' Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807."). Accord Jokiel v. Alpha Baking Co. Inc., No. 03 C
3845, 2005 WL 1563215, *3 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (in case of plaintiff terminated April 30,
2002, and awarded SSDI as of October 2002, but who sought disability benefits as of his
date of termination, the court ignored as irrelevant to the plaintiffs ADA claim defense
contentions regarding representations to SSA, because plaintiffs "claim of being completely
disabled as of April 30, 2002, is not necessarily inconsistent with his position that he would
have been able to perform his job with an accommodation for his alleged disability before
that date"). See also Markus v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n College Retirement Equities
Fund, No. 03-Civ. 646 (NRB), 2005 WL 742635, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2005) ("As
[Title VII] plaintiff never represented to the SSA that she was disabled in 1994, she is not
estopped [under Cleveland] from claiming.. . that she was capable of performing her job at
that time.").
120. Wells v. Dist. Lodge 751, 5 F. App'x 605, 606-07 (9h Cir. 2001).
121. 247 F.3d 169 (4h Cir. 2001).
122. Id. at 178. The Court of Appeals treated Fox's request for workers compensation
for temporary total disability from the State of West Virginia as if it were a SSDI
application.
123. Williams v. London Util. Comm'n, 375 F.3d 424 (6b Cir. 2004).
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rejected this explanation, stating: "It is incongruous that Mr.
Williams was able to perform his job requirements when he was
terminated on February 28, but he was unable to perform the
same work as of March 1."124 Thus, a temporal explanation for
inconsistent statements under Cleveland may be of limited use
where the immediate impetus for seeking SSDI benefits was a
worker's termination.125
SSDI Benefits Were Awarded Based on a "Listed Impairment"
Presuming Inability to Work
When determining whether an applicant is eligible to
receive SSDI benefits, the SSA uses a five step procedure which
asks an applicant:
* Step One: Are you presently working? (If so, you are
ineligible.) See 20 CFR § 404.1520(b)(1998).
* Step Two: Do you have a "severe impairment," i.e. one that
"significantly limits" your ability to do basic work
activities? (If not, you are ineligible.) See § 404.1520(c).
* Step Three: Does your impairment "mee[t] or equa[l]" an
impairment on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If
so, you are eligible without more.) See §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, 404.1526.
* Step Four: If your impairment does not meet or equal a
listed impairment, can you perform "past relevant
work?" (If so, you are ineligible.) See § 404.1520(e).
* Step Five: If [you answered "no" at Steps Three and Four],
then can you perform [any] other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy? (If not,
124. Id. at 429.
125. But cf Lukacinsky, Civ. No. 03-40141-FDS, 2004 WL 2915347, at *23 (accepting
ADA plaintiff's explanation that he became disabled on the date of his termination, given
that he "was actually working and performing the essential function of his job prior to, and
at the time of, his termination," and further, given that the SSA did not consider the
possibility of his working with a reasonable accommodation). Other courts have also
limited or rejected a plaintiffs temporal explanation. See, e.g., Townley v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Mich., 254 F. Supp. 2d 661, 666-68 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (SSA awarded
disability benefits as of the date of discharge to an applicant with a "history of illness,
including major depression"; the trial court in Townley's ADA case rejected her explanation
that her condition deteriorated upon termination, in light of deposition testimony that she




you are eligible.) See §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c). 12 6
Cleveland recognized that at Step Three, SSDI benefits are
awarded to applicants having a listed impairment by virtue of a
presumption that having a listed impairment implies inability to
work, rather than by actually considering documentation of
their inability to work.127
In Kieley v. Heartland Rehabilitation Services, the Sixth Circuit
reversed a grant of summary judgment against an ADA plaintiff
receiving SSDI benefits because he had a "listed" impairment as
set out in Step Three.12 8 The court of appeals held that a
"reasonable juror" could conclude Mr. Kieley applied for and
received SSDI benefits based on his blindness, "not on the basis
of an inability to work." 129
SSA Approval of SSDI Benefits for Persons Able to Work
The Cleveland Court also recognized that "the SSA
sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who not only can
work, but are working."o30 For example, an individual may
receive full SSDI benefits for up to nine months after reentering
the workforce, in order to facilitate reentry."1 The right to
invoke ADA protections may be especially relevant for a SSDI
recipient who faces discrimination upon seeking to reenter the
workforce. Thus, employers should be precluded from asserting
both a job applicant is not qualified to work and from asking to
dismiss an applicant's ADA claims, simply because he or she
receives SSDI benefits.
126. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added).
127. Id. See 20 C.F.R. Pt.404, Subpt. P, Appx. 1 (2005) ("Listing of Impairments").
Brief of AIDS Policy Center for Children, Youth and Families; et al, as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Cleveland, 526 U.S. 795, 1997 U.S. Briefs 4008, *24 (noting some
of many listed impairments that do not preclude persons from working: blindness;
paraplegia; severe hearing or speech loss; forms of chronic anemia; mental retardation; and
AIDS).
128. 359 F.3d 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2004).
129. Id. at 390.
130. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c) (1998). According to the SSA, "[t]he trial work period
allows you to test your ability to work for at least 9 months. During your trial work period,
you will receive your full disability benefit regardless of how much you earn as long as you
continue to be disabled." Social Security Online, The Work Site, available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/work/ResourcesToolkit/workincentiveschart.html#TWP. See
also Pub. L. 106-170, The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999
(discussing Ticket to Work Program).
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An ADA Claimant Has Applied For, But Not Received, SSDI
Benefits
The Fourth Circuit relied in part on Cleveland in affirming a
trial court's denial of judgment as a matter of law to General
Electric Co. (GE), following a jury verdict against GE and in
favor of a GE machinist who spent nearly two years on a long-
term disability pension due to back pain, but was denied both
SSDI benefits and an "unqualified release to work" when his
private pension benefits were exhausted.13 2 The court of appeals
refused to disturb the district court's rejection of GE's judicial
estoppel argument based on the plaintiff's representations to the
SSA and his private disability insurer that he was unable to
work. An unsuccessful SSDI application did not justify estoppel,
the court ruled, because "the inconsistency between Giles's prior
statements and his assertions in [his ADA] litigation" was "the
sort normally tolerated by our legal system ... [whereby] a
person may not be sure in advance upon which legal theory she
will succeed, and so [is] permit[ted] to 'set forth two or more
statements of a claim or defense . .. alternately ... ."'13
Since Cleveland, several courts have identified still other
grounds for permitting ADA claims by SSDI recipients to
proceed. For instance, in Thompson v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co., a federal trial court held that judicial estoppel was
inappropriate to bar an ADA claim where plaintiff "was told
both that he was being placed into total and permanent disability
retirement, and that he was required, under the terms of the
[private] disability plan, to apply for SSDI benefits."'3 The court
explained:
Even assuming that Plaintiff already anticipated, at that
early date, that he would pursue an ADA claim against
his employer, it would have been rather bold of him to
assume that he ultimately would prevail on that claim,
so that he could safely disregard Defendant's
instruction that he apply for SSDI benefits and thereby
risk forfeiting the benefits he would, if all else failed,
receive under Defendant's total and permanent
[private] disability plan. The Court does not read
132. Giles, 245 F.3d at 479-481.
133. Id at 483-84 (quoting Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805).




Cleveland's "explanation" requirement as compelling a
litigant in Plaintiff's position to run such a risk in order
to preserve the viability of his ADA claim.13 s
In Felix v. New York City Transit Authority, another federal trial
court found the plaintiff's "contradictory positions" were
sufficiently explained by "evidence that the SSA intake officer
may have misunderstood, or misadvised with regard to,
[plaintiff's] initial statements concerning her disability."136
THE RELEVANCE OF CLEVELAND TO OTHER CLAIMS OF
DISABILITY-BASED WORKPLACE BIAS
For the most part, the reasoning in Cleveland has been applied
wholesale by federal courts assessing employer efforts to
dismiss ADA claims by asserting they are irretrievably
undermined by plaintiff assertions of disability and inability to
work in seeking disability benefits from private insurers or state
or local governments. 37
Yet, some courts have discerned such material differences
between SSDI and other disability benefit schemes as to
conclude Cleveland does not foreclose disability bias claims. For
instance, in Murphey v. City of Minneapolis, the Eighth Circuit
declared Cleveland inapplicable and overruled a trial court's
recognition of a preclusive effect on an ADA claim, because the
appeals court found Minnesota's decision to continue public
employee disability retirement benefits significantly "divergent"
from SSDI's provisions. In Minnesota, a recipient of such
benefits may continue to receive them, even after he or she
return to work, if a worker receives less in salary in his or her
new job than he or she received prior to the start of his or her
disability benefits.138
135. Id.
136. 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (citing Stowe-Pharr Mills, 216 F.3d
373, 376, (in which the appeals court permitted ADA and SSDI claims "where the plaintiff-
applicant informed [a SSA] intake officer that she could work with an accommodation but,
upon the officer's advice, her application stated otherwise [i.e., it stated that she was 'unable
to work']").
137. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Greater Hazleton Health Alliance, 22 Fed.Appx. 581, 586
n.9 (3d Cir. 2004) (following Cleveland in finding an ADA claim not foreclosed by
plaintiffs statements in her worker's compensation record "that she was fully disabled," but
rather, by her failure to offer evidence "how she could nevertheless perform the essential
functions of her job with or without accommodation.").
138. 358 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.10 (8th Cir. 2004).
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A 2003 Third Circuit decision, Detz v. Greiner Industries,
Inc., endorsed Cleveland's analysis as fully applicable in a case
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and
an analogous Pennsylvania age bias law.139 Ralph Detz lost his
job and later sought and received SSDI, as of the date of his
termination, based on evidence he had multiple impairments:
depression, lung problems, high blood pressure, and loss of use
of his left arm and hand. 40 When Detz sued for age bias, the
district court ruled for Greiner, applying judicial estoppel to
Detz's claims. The District Court also ruled that Cleveland
applied to the plaintiffs ADEA claim. The trial court "found
that while Detz might have survived summary judgment if he
had offered a sufficient explanation of the apparent
inconsistency between his two positions, he failed to adequately
reconcile the positions." 141 The Court of Appeals affirmed,
noting:
While Cleveland only specifically addressed a conflict
between SSDI and ADA claims, the analysis is not
limited in its application to cases involving those
particular statutory and administrative schemes. Like
an assertion that one is a 'qualified individual' for ADA
purposes, a declaration that one is a 'qualified
individual' under the ADEA is a 'context-related legal
conclusion.' Therefore, a prima facie showing under
the ADEA that conflicts with earlier statements made to
the SSA is subject to the same analysis .. . the District
Court here properly observed that 'scenarios may exist
in which it is possible for a plaintiff's ADEA claim to be
consistent with his or her earlier [SSDI]
application....' For example, a person who files for
and is granted SSDI benefits several months after his
discharge would not be precluded from advancing a
successful ADEA claim against his employer where his
disability did not prevent him from working at the time
of his discharge, but where it subsequently worsened to
a point where he is no longer able to perform that
work. It is true that these scenarios might be less
common with ADEA claims than... under the ADA,
139. 346 F.3d 109, 115-121 (3rd Cir. 2003).
140. Id. at 112.
141. Id. at 114. (quoting Detz, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 917) (SSDI awarded Detz benefits at
Steps 4 & 5 of its review process, in which it expressly considers ability to work, not at Step
3, based on a "listed impairment.").
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because the ADEA does not include any additional
considerations for identifying 'qualified individuals'
that might be analogized to the 'reasonable
accommodation' language of the ADA.... This does
not, however, render Cleveland any less
applicable ... 14 2
At least two federal district courts have applied Cleveland's
analysis to age discrimination claims in the workplace in a
similar manner.143
THE RELEVANCE OF CLEVELAND TO EFFORTS AT THE STATE
LEVEL TO IMPOSE JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Recent events in Minnesota have dramatized another respect in
which Cleveland continues to influence legal rights and economic
prospects of persons with disabilities. In Huston v. Commissioner,
an intermediate state appellate court relied on Cleveland in
striking down, as violating Title II of the ADA, a provision of
Minnesota's unemployment insurance (UI) law requiring UI
recipients to forfeit benefits for any week in which they also
received SSDI benefits, based on an "irrebuttable presumption"
that receiving SSDI proves beneficiaries are "unable to work and
as such are automatically disqualified from receipt of
unemployment benefits."'" Such a posture was untenable, the
state court opined, given Cleveland's analysis of SSDI
procedures, and in particular, Step Three of the eligibility
determination process, at least as applied to individuals who
secure SSDI "based on a categorical impairment where the SSA
undertakes no [actuall assessment of the applicant's actual
ability and availability to work."14 5  The Minnesota appellate
court declared:
We recognize that application for or receipt of SSDI
142. Id. at 117.
143. See McClaren v. Morrison Mgmt. Specialists, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 489, 500-504
(W.D. Tex. 2004); Johnson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 02 C 5003, 2004 WL 419897, (N.D.
111. Feb. 2, 2004). See also Nodelman, No. 98 CIV. 1231 (LMM), 2000 WL 502858, at*l 1-
12 (applying Cleveland analysis to ADEA claim, despite pre-Cleveland decision applying
judicial estoppel in such circumstances: Detz, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
opining that "were the Second Circuit now faced with this issue, it might, in light of
Cleveland, decide it differently").
144. Huston v. Comm'r of Employment & Econ. Dev., 672 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085 subd. 4) (West 2003).
145. Id. at 611.
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benefits normally represents a determination, first by
the avelicant and ultimately by the SSA, that the
avlicant is not able to work and is out of the iob
market. In administerine the unemolovment
compensation vrogram, the state of Minnesota may
leeitimatelv use the federal SSDI orogram as a
reference for simplifvine determinations of who is
attached to the iob market. But, the statute goes too far
in making the presumption irrebuttable. The applicant
for unemployment benefits should be able to make his
case.146
The case was remanded for further proceedings, but the State
appealed.
Joshua Huston has a severe hearing impairment, and on
that basis alone, under "Step Three," the SSA awarded him SSDI
benefits. Yet Huston also was able to work, and only sought
SSDI when he was laid off and his state UI benefits ran out.
Although nothing had changed to make him unable to work,
and without conducting an actual examination of his
employability, Minnesota sought to recover the full amount of
$15,552 it had paid him in UI benefits. An administrative law
judge later set a lower amount of $7,012 for the State's recovery.
147 Yet such a sum still would amount to a crushing debt and
repayment burden for many unemployed persons, who typically
are able to save little, or nothing, of what they receive in public
benefits such as workers compensation or SSDI.
Huston's case squarely demonstrates that Cleveland is a
brake on potential mischief by state legislatures so intent on
budget-balancing that they try to do so on the backs of persons
with limited income and serious physical or mental
impairments, many of whom struggle to earn a living on the
margins of the labor market. Because Huston received SSDI
benefits, however, his case did not directly implicate other, more
troubling, language in the Minnesota statute requiring UI
recipients to return UI benefits for any week for which they
merely applied for SSDI benefits. In a prior case, an intermediate
appellate court upheld Minnesota's right to recover UI benefits
from a mere SSDI applicant.' 8
146. Id..
147. Id. at 608.
148. See Roloff v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Employment and Econ. Dev., 668 N.W.2d
12, 16-17 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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Minnesota appealed the Huston decision and Huston cross-
appealed. Amici curiae supporting Huston urged the Minnesota
Supreme Court to find that Cleveland precludes even a rebuttable
presumption that a SSDI recipient is unable to work.14 9 Further,
one of the amici asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to declare
the Roloff decision inconsistent with the ADA, as interpreted in
Cleveland, because it requires disgorgement of State UI benefits
paid to mere SSDI applicants, based on an unfounded,
irrebutable presumption that an applicant's assertion of
"disability" in order to comply with the SSDI program
requirements constitutes an admission of inability to work, and
thus, ineligibility for UI.15o However, before the Minnesota
Supreme Court ruled, the state legislature amended the law.
Then, the State reversed course and agreed that Huston was
entitled to the unemployment benefits he had received. Both
parties agreed to withdraw their appeals.
The amended statute retains a provision requiring
repayment of UI benefits received if an individual merely
applies for SSDI and includes an explicit presumption that SSDI
recipients are "unable to work and [are] unavailable for suitable
employment."15' On these grounds, at least, the new law still
clashes with Cleveland, and thus, would seem open to a future
legal challenge.
The amendment to Minnesota statute § 268.085(4) also
creates a new procedure for an UI recipient/SSDI applicant to
rebut a presumed inability to work, by providing "a statement
from an appropriate health care professional who is aware of the
applicant's Social Security disability claim and the basis for that
claim, certifying that the applicant is able to work and available
for suitable employment."15 2 Such a statement would reconcile
UI requirements, that a recipient be able and available to work,
with SSDI requirements, by obliging a certifying doctor to be
"aware of the applicant's Social Security disability claim and the
149. Huston, 672 N.W.2d at 612 (the appellate court criticized the Minnesota
Legislature for failing to give "individuals who are disabled, filing for or receiving SSDI
benefits,... an opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are unable to work" in
seeking UI benefits from the State).
150. The principal author of this article filed an amicus brief on behalf of AARP
supporting Huston, and asking the Minnesota Supreme Court to disavow Roloff Mid-
Minnesota Legal Assistance also filed an amicus brief supporting Huston, who was
represented by University Legal Services at the University of Minnesota.
151. MfNN. STAT. ANN. § 268.085(4) (West Supp. 2004).
152. § 268.085(4)(b)(2).
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basis for [it]."153 Depending on how strictly the procedure is
implemented, it may be either a more demanding or a more
lenient "explanation requirement" than the one adopted in
Cleveland. This scheme poses the question whether Minnesota
courts will allow a doctor's letter to substitute for the sort of
judicial scrutiny undertaken in Cleveland. Or, will such letters
just be more evidence for courts to weigh, case-by-case, on the
issue of eligibility for UI benefits?M
CONCLUSION
Cleveland seemed to be a major victory for ADA plaintiffs. They
were no longer per se barred from pursuing a disability-bias
claim by their prior receipt of, or application for, SSDI benefits.
Even though courts were instructed to grant defendants
summary judgment when plaintiffs failed to offer a "sufficient
explanation" for factual statements, or even some legal
assertions, about their "disability" status, Cleveland set a
favorable tone by explaining numerous ways that ADA and
SSDI claims could be reconciled.
Six years later, Cleveland provides a reliable, albeit different
roadmap for ADA defendants seeking summary judgment
against claimants who have received SSDI benefits. Judicial
estoppel, or its equivalent, continues to be applied to prevent
SSDI recipients from bringing ADA claims, especially where a
SSDI recipient has made the sort of statement to SSA about her
disability that can be characterized as "purely factual," and
moreover, as an admission of a complete inability to work.
Overall, the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland provides
no more than modest relief to the class of ADA plaintiffs seeking
and/or receiving SSDI benefits. Most poignant, and contrary to
Congressional intent in enacting the ADA and the SSDI
program, is that Cleveland is of little help to many disabled
workers who have been terminated, desperately need income,
can still perform well in some jobs, and would prefer gainful
153. Id.
154. An intermediate appellate court in Michigan likewise has applied Cleveland in
interpreting state anti-bias law. In Carpenter v. Snacktime Serv., Inc., No. 252434, 252761,
2005 WL 763308, at *8-9 (Mich. Ct. App. April 5, 2005), the Court of Appeals of Michigan
held a plaintiff was estopped from bringing a disability-bias claim against her employer
under the state's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act due to factually inconsistent
statements about her ability to work made during her state worker's compensation hearing.
65
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
employment to a monthly SSDI check.
The Cleveland Court described many instances in which an
ADA claim and receipt of SSDI benefits may comfortably co-
exist, and the lower federal courts and state courts generally
have abided by this specific guidance. Further, because of
Cleveland, many disability recipients presumably have never had
to face claims of judicial estoppel when they sue for disability
bias on the job. Finally, Cleveland has proven of value in
resisting the effort by at least one state legislature, in Minnesota,
to cut its deficit by reducing aid for displaced workers who also
apply for and/or receive SSDI benefits.
But each of the categories of cases in which Cleveland said
ADA and SSDI claims are consistent is narrow. The prospect of
pressing both claims is daunting in view of the realities facing
many disabled individuals who have lost their jobs. Practically
speaking, disabled persons considering challenging their
termination in an ADA suit face a long delay in having such a
case resolved, as well as the strong possibility of losing. Thus, in
many instances they have little choice but to apply for disability
benefits. A weak financial condition is strong incentive to seek
disability benefits effective on or about the date of their
termination. Yet as many court decisions have shown, to take
both these steps is to jeopardize an ADA claim and possibly
undermine an entitlement to disability benefits. Further, to
make only general assertions of disability on a SSDI application
in order to avoid possible harm to a subsequent ADA suit also
may detract from an applicant's chances of securing benefits."'
The problems with Cleveland are many and varied. They
include insufficient judicial appreciation of the differences
between ADA and SSDI standards of "disability."5 6 These
155. Generally, individuals who describe specific ailments and discuss in detail their
difficulties working are more likely to convince the SSA that their impairments are severe
enough for them to qualify for SSDI. See, e.g., Social Security Administration, "What You
Should Know Before You Apply For Social Security Disability Benefits," available at
https://s044a90.ssa.gov/apps6a/i3369/eeOO-fe.jsp ("Can I do anything to speed up the
decision? Yes. You can speed things up by making sure you have the information listed on
the checklist for your interview .... Bring the documents and information with you. If you
are having a telephone interview, have all of the information with you when you call ....
You may also shorten your interview time by using the enclosed Medical and Job
Worksheet prior to the interview .... You should also bring in any medical records you
have, and bring in all of the medicine you are taking.").
156. See Hugo Benitez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky & John Rust, How Large Are the
Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process?, NBER Working
Papers No. W10219 available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0219 (January 2004)
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difficulties are compounded by undue judicial concern with
possible inconsistencies between statements employed to
support ADA and SSDI claims.
Some courts have simply shown inadequate attention to the
central issue in ADA employment cases brought by SSDI
recipients: whether the plaintiff actually was qualified to do the
job in question at the time of the challenged termination or other
adverse employment action by the employer. In such instances,
courts often have been too quick to find a SSDI application
factually inconsistent with a plaintiffs disability bias claims.
The result has been unwarranted summary judgments for
employers.
Decisions applying Cleveland also reflect insufficient judicial
appreciation for the fact that both the ADA and the SSDI reflect
Congress's commitment to encourage and permit disabled
individuals to continue working whenever possible. Ironically,
inadequate efforts to give life to this objective have made it
harder-not easier-for the minority of SSDI recipients who can
work to invoke the ADA to prevent their movement from the
workforce to long-term reliance on income support from the
government. Despite Cleveland's extensive documentation
regarding how ADA and SSDI claims may be reconciled, some
judges continue to give short shrift to ADA claims by SSDI
recipients.
("[E]ven if individuals truthfully report whether they are capable of working or not, they
may be using a different standard or 'threshold' of disability than the SSA.").
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